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Soteriological Pragmatism and Psychotherapy: The 
Buddhist Concept of “Means” in the Writings of the 
Modern Buddhist Philosopher Inoue Enryō
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In hiS book Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism, Michael Pye introduced the Western reader to the far-reaching significance that 
the term “means” (Skt. upāya; Ch. fangbian 方便; Jp. hōben), or “skill in 
means” (Skt. upāya-kauśalya; Ch. shanqiao fangbian 善巧方便; Jp. zengyō 
hōben), has for East Asian Mahayana Buddhism. Pye pointed to a variety 
of philosophical implications that the Buddhist idea of “means” contains, 
and these have since been given further scrutiny in English-language schol-
arship.1 In particular, the concept of “skillful means” in the Lotus Sutra has 
elicited discussion from exegetical2 as well as ethical points of view.3 By 
examining occurrences of the term in the writings of the modern Buddhist 
philosopher Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919), I hope to shed further light 
on the philosophical potential of this fascinating religious concept.
Although there exists a considerable amount of research on Inoue’s Bud-
dhist writings,4 his use of the concept of “skillful means” has not attracted 
any attention in English or Japanese scholarship. This is partly due to the 
fact that the concept is not central to, or representative of, Inoue’s Buddhist 
philosophy as a whole. The passages in which Inoue explicitly discusses or 
makes use of the concept of “skillfull means” are rather limited. This article 
1 Schroeder 2001.
2 Reeves 2002, Federmnan 2009, Schroeder 2011.
3 Keown 2002, Goodman 2011. 
4 See the bibliographies in “Inoue Enryo Research Database.” 2016. Compiled by Rainer 
Schulzer. International Association for Inoue Enryo Research. http://www.toyo.ac.jp/site/ 
iair/33402.html.
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will examine the most significant occurrences in Inoue’s Buddhist writings. 
The books I cite are from different periods of his life: his early manifesto 
Bukkyō katsuron joron 仏教活論序論 (Prolegomena to a Living Discourse 
on Buddhism) from 1887; the 1898 recorded lecture series Bukkyō rika 
仏教理科 (Buddhist Science) and the 1904 monograph Shinri ryōhō 心理
療法 (Psychotherapy) from Inoue’s middle period; and the last part and 
summary of his magnum opus on Buddhist doctrine Katsu Bukkyō 活仏教 
(Living Buddhism) from 1912. For the sake of my argument, the books will 
not be quoted in chronological order. Rather than an account of the devel-
opment of Inoue’s thought, the main purpose of this article is philosophical 
investigation. I will distinguish four different uses of the concept:
(1) “Means” as a hermeneutic tool: Buddhist doctrines inconsistent 
with the scientific worldview can be interpreted as soteriological 
devices.
(2) “Means” as a psychotherapeutic approach: faith can work as a self-
fulfilling prophecy in healing.
(3) “Means” as a pragmatic concept of religious truth: a teaching that 
reduces suffering is a true teaching.
(4) “Means” as a Buddhist concept of tolerance: religious “dispositions” 
(Jp. kikon 機根) are various, therefore the teachings must be too.
I will not attempt to demonstrate that these four uses are philosophically 
consistent with each other. Despite the overall systematic appearance of 
Inoue’s writings, his ultimate ambition was not to bequeath a final philo-
sophical system. His well-structured, but sometimes overly schematic style 
of thinking allowed him to extend his thought into new theoretical fields 
and to explore the discursive space of the modern humanities. Inoue spelled 
out the Aristotelian paradigm of classified research areas for the first time in 
the history of modern Japanese humanities. In the philosophical paradigm 
of systematic thinking, the Buddhist concept of “means” takes on different 
meanings depending on the scholarly field in which it is applied or inter-
preted. Inoue was too absorbed by his pioneering efforts to worry about 
whether his interpretations of the Buddhist notion of “skillful means” in the 
context of psychotherapy, Buddhist hermeneutics, or Buddhist philosophy 
were perfectly consistent with each other. Instead of discussing his applica-
tion of the concept of “means” in terms of its distortion of, or authentic-
ity to, the Buddhist tradition, a more specific observation is possible here: 
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through the prism of modern scholarly diversification, the full philosophical 
potential and depth of this traditional Buddhist concept becomes apparent.
(1) “Means” as a hermeneutic tool: Buddhist doctrines inconsistent with 
the scientific worldview can be interpreted as soteriological devices
In his lectures in Bukkyō rika, Inoue discusses a great variety of Buddhist 
doctrines that can claim validity in the light of logic and modern science. 
But he also reflects on the status of those doctrines that had lost their cred-
ibility as philosophical or scientific statements about the empirical world. 
In the chapter on the Buddhist cosmology centered around Mt. Sumeru we 
find the following passage:
Philosophically, Buddhism rejects objectivity and unfolds sub-
jectivity. It turns down materialism and takes the standpoint of 
idealism. Religiously, Buddhism leaves the realm of delusion 
and enters the realm of awakening. It escapes the realm of life 
and death and reaches the realm of nirvana. The doctrine of Mt. 
Sumeru therefore is a teaching that in the first instance must be 
rejected by Buddhism. If, in the context of reincarnation through 
the six realms, following the causal logic of good and evil it 
becomes necessary to teach karmic retribution in the Mt. Sumeru 
heaven, this is nothing else but what Buddhism calls a “means.” 
Although the ninety-five heterodox schools [that existed] before 
the Buddha were not identical, all took birth in the Mt. Sumeru 
heaven as the ultimate end. When the Buddha appeared in the 
world and wished to defeat the heterodox aberrations, he could 
have pointed to the fruit of awakening (bukka 仏果) beyond this 
heaven. However, toward the followers of the brahmin path who 
firmly believed in heavenly retribution, he did not refute the 
teaching [of Mt. Sumeru heaven], but rather took it as a ladder for 
ascending to the fruit of awakening. He realized it as a means of 
guidance to the [right] path and eventually started to use it. This 
does not mean that he acknowledged the Mt. Sumeru heaven, 
instead it is clear that he rejected it. . . . It is only mixed into Bud-
dhism, like sugar is mixed into a [bitter] medicine. It is a “skillful 
means” directed toward the followers of the brahmin path, who do 
not know that there is a realm to be aspired to besides heavenly 
reward, because their perspective is narrow like the frog sitting 
in the well. . . . Stating the condition of highest happiness and 
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utmost blessing about the Mt. Sumeru heaven is obviously only 
a means of guidance appropriate to the disposition (zuiki dōnyū 
随機導入) [of the audience]. If the Buddhist writings were a set 
of books about physics, such would certainly not be forgivable, 
but as a type of religious writing, it might be legitimate since it is 
the same as attracting the lover of wine with wine, or enticing a 
connoisseur of crackers with crackers. However, even if we pro-
visionally consider today the Mt. Sumeru teaching as erroneous 
speech and the theory that the earth is a sphere as true, wouldn’t 
today’s astronomical and geophysical theory be useless for teach-
ing heavenly retribution to the followers of the brahmin path? 
This should be seen as the reason why Mt. Sumeru appears in the 
Buddhist writings.5
Although I am not in a position to decide whether all ninety-five schools 
of pre-Buddhist Indian philosophy had as their only goal karmic reward in 
the Mt. Sumeru heaven, on first sight this claim seems doubtful. In order 
to decide the historical correctness of such a proposition, nobody in Japan 
today would use Inoue’s writings as reference works. Indian and Buddhist 
studies in Japan left Inoue behind a long time ago. However, in its pre-
ponderance of detailed historical and philological investigations, Japanese 
humanities has missed out on what can still be learned from Inoue. As an 
advocate of enlightenment, Inoue never puts aside the question of the valid-
ity, or in his own words, the “discussion” (ron 論) about the present “appli-
cability” or “fertility” (katsu 活) of a certain theory. This is how the title of 
Inoue’s magnum opus in three parts, Bukkyō katsuron 仏教活論,6 should be 
interpreted. Different from the all-neutralizing eye of historical research, 
Inoue had the courage to express clearly which doctrines of his own reli-
gion had lost credibility in the face of modern science. Such a straightfor-
ward statement gives rise to the philosophical discussion of whether there 
are different hermeneutic angles to interpret otherwise obsolete doctrines. 
The following quotation concisely summarizes Inoue’s enlightenment 
approach:
Insofar as we can have physical knowledge of the movements of 
the earth and the sky, we have to rely on objective explanations. 
5 Inoue Enryō senshū 井上円了選集 (hereafter, IS), vol. 7, pp. 417–18. All translations are 
by the author.
6 IS, vol. 4, Part One (1887), Part Two (1890), and Part Three (1912).
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If we reach a point at which we cannot know through physics, 
we have to apply subjective explanations. The old Buddhists, 
however, take the teachings as seen in the sutras and śāstras as 
the one and only everlasting golden words, without asking if they 
might be metaphors or means.7
Inoue Enryō’s use of the concept of “means” as a hermeneutic device has in 
fact certain precedents in the Buddhist tradition. Not only in the East Asian 
treatises on “teaching classifications” (kyōhan 教判), but already in the Lotus 
Sutra the term is used to reinterpret older teachings: although the literal sig-
nificance of the doctrines of the “Small Vehicle” (Hinayana) is questioned, the 
older teachings were still admissible as crutches to attain the same end as the 
“Great Vehicle” (Mahayana).8 This usage of the term indeed parallels Inoue’s 
modern hermeneutic approach. The motivation for his reinterpretation, how-
ever, differs: whereas the early advocates of Mahayana Buddhism appealed to 
the authority of the deified Buddha, Inoue’s criterion for doctrinal credibility 
was external to Buddhism. It was his enlightenment commitment to the natu-
ral sciences that forced him to review the older doctrines in a new light.
(2) “Means” as a psychotherapeutic approach: faith can work as a self-
fulfilling prophecy in healing
Inoue’s enlightenment conviction that many religious doctrines have no 
credibility as literal statements about the empirical world forced him to 
clarify the transforming effects faith nevertheless has on religious persons. 
In his 1904 work Shinri ryōhō he writes:
When people are cured by holy water or an illness is eased by 
taboos, such effects are not due to divine powers, but to the 
functioning of belief (shinkō sayō 信仰作用). This should be 
seen as a type of psychotherapy. However, things like holy water 
and taboos also cause considerable harm when superstitiously 
believed by uneducated people. Therefore, I advocate avoiding 
the harmful and selecting the beneficial; to drop the irrational and 
adopt the rational.9
Trust in prayers and incantations in order to cure a malady and 
complete reliance on [the gods of riches] Ebisu 蛭子 and Daikoku 
7 Bukkyō rika, IS, vol. 7, p. 364.
8 Federman 2009.
9 Shinri ryōhō, IS, vol. 10, p. 179.
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大黒 to acquire wealth should not be seen as the same thing. The 
latter has no benefit whatsoever, whereas the former will cer-
tainly exhibit a [positive] influence to some degree. If the patient 
believes in [the effect of the prayer] and gains comfort from it, 
this will doubtlessly have a therapeutic effect. This effect, how-
ever, is not due to the obscure protection by gods and buddhas, 
but through the power of the function of the mind.10
The doctrine of Mt. Sumeru heaven might be interpreted as an illustration 
or a metaphor applied in spiritual guidance; yet even if the transcendent 
heaven is put forth in a rather literal way, the impossibility of falsifying 
the teaching renders the means comparably harmless. The case of magi-
cal prayers or wondrous drugs is different, however. Inoue clearly admits 
that their efficacy is not based on empirical mechanisms, but only due to 
the force of faith. Therefore, unless the believer is deceived about the real 
nature of the means, such faith could not exhibit its power.
An act of deception with the purpose of benefitting the deceived is called 
a paternalistic (or white) lie. Inoue points to the interesting parallel that 
paternalistic deception lends itself to being used not only by a priest or sha-
man, but also by a medical doctor.
If a doctor makes a house call, the patient will feel that his pain or 
suffering has been reduced to a certain degree. If the doctor does 
not make a house call, he feels that his malady is worsening. Both 
instances are due to the functioning of belief. Further, it is often 
the case that the doctor, upon examining the patient, does not 
tell him the truth. Although, for example, the doctor’s diagnosis 
suggests that there is no prospect of full recovery, and the doctor 
possibly believes that the medicine will have no effect, he might 
say to the patient that taking the medicine will surely cure him in 
a few days. Or, a doctor, who, despite believing in his heart that 
there are true symptoms of tuberculosis, may tell the patient that 
he has a cough or bronchitis. Such [instances] are nothing else 
but temporary means not to cause feelings of fear, unrest, or worry 
in the patient’s heart. It is obvious that such means are in the first 
place not the original intent of physiological therapy but a problem 
of psychological therapy. The fact that today’s medical doctors 
use the functioning of belief to enhance the effects of therapy 
10 Shinri ryōhō, IS, vol. 10, p. 207.
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(not only in internal, but also in external treatment) and at the 
same time repudiate belief therapy clearly has to be called a self-
contradiction.11
Inoue is not so interested in the ethical problem of paternalist deception but 
rather in the fact that medicine should not underestimate the healing effects 
of faith. In his work Shinri ryōhō, Inoue thereby anticipates insights that 
are discussed in the twentieth century under the names of “psychosomatic 
medicine” or “placebo-effect.”
(3) “Means” as a pragmatic concept of religious truth: a teaching that 
reduces suffering is a true teaching
The most abstract discussion of the status of salvific means can be found 
in Inoue’s early manifesto, Bukkyō katsuron joron. With explicit reference 
to the Lotus Sutra he claims that means are true means if they prove to be 
effective:
In the Lotus Sutra [the Buddha] exposed the [provisional] gate-
way of means and revealed the real truth. The Lotus Sutra is the 
truth, whereas the Āgama and Prajñā [sutras] are means. But tak-
ing them as means does not mean that these teachings are false. 
Means are a ladder to reach the truth. If there is an end, there nec-
essarily must be a ladder to reach it. If the end is reached through 
the ladder, the means becomes true. For example, is not gaining 
wealth taken to be a true end? If the merchant is gaining wealth 
by his business strategy this strategy is true. If the farmer is gain-
ing wealth through his agriculture his agriculture is true. What 
else would be the reason to distinguish between true and false 
among farmers and merchants? If the aspired end is reached, all 
means are equally true.12
Inoue’s argument in this passage has at least three problematic philosophical 
implications. First, one can agree that a certain method or technology proves 
itself right if the end for which it was applied is achieved. For example, the 
construction plan of an airplane is correct if the plane eventually flies. But 
Inoue’s comparison of soteriological means with empirical means belies 
the problem that in the psychological or spiritual context even means that 
11 Shinri ryōhō, IS, vol. 10, pp. 185–86.
12 Bukkyō katsuron joron, IS, vol. 3, p. 381.
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empirically do not work can have some efect. A plane, even if we firmly 
believe it to be a good plane, will not fly if it is constructed wrongly. A lad-
der, even if we firmly believe it to be a stable ladder, will not hold if it is 
rotten. However, a magical prayer or a placebo medicine, even if the means 
do not release any physiological mechanisms, can still have self-fulfilling 
effects on the subject believing in it. 
Second, the comparison with concrete methods or technologies obscures 
another difficulty. Inoue pays no attention to the ethical problem that the 
end does not justify the means. The strategy of a merchant to deceive his 
business partners in order to make riches might be successful but is not 
legitimate. In the parable found in chapter 16 of the Lotus Sutra, the father, 
who falsely let his children believe his own death in order to make his poi-
soned children drink the antidote, may instead be justified.13 The existence 
of the father appears to be the last connection his deranged children have 
with reality. The shock of the message about their father’s death brings 
them back to sanity, and finally they drink the antidote he prepared.
Third, the claim that means of guidance to the religious truth are them-
selves true raises the question of the overall difference between means to 
the truth and the truth as such. The Lotus Sutra exposes all previous Bud-
dhist teachings as mere means and presents itself as the ultimate sermon 
of the Buddha lore. Yet it is not in fact clear what the content of this ulti-
mate verbalization of the Buddha’s teaching is.14 The only doctrine that is 
clearly stated is the promise of universal salvation for all sentient beings. 
The allowance for an innumerable number of salvific means appears to be 
the flip side of the promise of universal deliverance. There is no other mes-
sage than the claim that everybody will find enlightenment thanks to the 
inexhaustible repertoire of means applied by buddhas and bodhisattvas. 
According to this interpretation of the Lotus Sutra, Inoue’s concluding iden-
tification of means and truth is indeed plausible: “There is no truth separate 
from means, and no means separate from the truth. The means are the truth, 
and the truth is the means.”15
A pragmatic theory of truth is sometimes cited as an alternative to the 
correspondence theory of truth, which states the common sense idea that 
propositions are true if they correspond to the facts. However, arguing for 
a pragmatic concept of truth in matters of religion does not necessarily 
13 T no. 262, 9:42a29–44a04. Cf. Keown 2002; Goodman 2011. 
14 Cf. Pye 2003, p. 20.
15 Bukkyō katsuron joron, IS, vol. 3, p. 382. 
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commit to this very theory in all other scholarly contexts. Instead, I believe, 
the pragmatic concept of religious truth is meaningful only because corre-
spondence is per definition ruled out in religious affairs. Insofar as religion 
relates to the transcendent, its propositions cannot be falsified. Teachings 
about heaven or protective deities can therefore be accepted as a form of 
religious truth if they benefit the believer.
(4) “Means” as a Buddhist concept of tolerance: religious “dispositions” 
are various, therefore the teachings must be too
Although Inoue did stress the scientific and philosophical elements in Bud-
dhist doctrines, he did not claim that scientific explanation of the world was 
the main objective of Buddhism. The end of Buddhism is instead the reduc-
tion of suffering and the spiritual deliverance of human beings. In order to 
achieve this spiritual or psychological end, according to Inoue, it is expedi-
ent to acknowledge different approaches:
Buddhism is split up in many branches, sects, and schools, which 
all have different standpoints. If I were asked on what my faith 
relies, I would answer it relies on the True [Pure Land] school 
(Shinshū 真宗). Buddhism is known as a teaching that provides 
a remedy appropriate to the disease (ōbyō yoyaku 応病与薬). It 
allows the freedom to choose the school according to one’s dis-
position. Because I was born into the tradition of the True school, 
and first received my education inside its gates, I realize that the 
teaching of the True school is the religious faith best suited to my 
spiritual temperament (shinshō 信性). It is a valuable medicine 
appropriate to my malady. Yet, in my True school faith I am not 
narrow-minded and prejudiced as are other believers. On the one 
hand, I profess a progressive policy that allows for free philo-
sophical investigation not only of Buddhist doctrine [in general] 
but also of True school beliefs. On the other hand, having faith in 
the True school, I do not reject others believing in other schools. 
It is enough if everybody receives the teaching suitable to his dis-
position of suffering.16
The attitude Inoue makes explicit here is one of inter-Buddhist tolerance. 
He dispenses with the question of doctrinal truth in favor of the pragmatic 
attitude that teachings that provide relief from suffering are legitimate 
16 Katsu Bukkyō, IS, vol. 4, pp. 387–88.
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expressions of the Buddhist path. If Buddhism is committed to the reduc-
tion of suffering, it has to adjust to the complete variety of individual dispo-
sitions in order to live up to its promise of universal salvation.
I moreover believe that such a Buddhist concept of tolerance, which is 
made explicit in the passage above, is also potentially applicable in relation 
to other religions. Buddhism can fully tolerate other religions insofar as 
they contribute to the well-being of their followers and reduce suffering in 
the world. Herein lies a big difference to the great monotheistic religions. A 
God who is source, guarantor, and judge of morality cannot easily be rela-
tivized as being merely one means among others.
Concluding Remarks
This essay has discussed four different uses of the Buddhist concept of 
“means” in the writings of Inoue Enryō. It is no coincidence that we 
encountered comparisons with medicine in each of the four cases. As the 
phrase “providing a remedy appropriate to the disease,”17 found in the 
Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sutra, suggests, there has long been an awareness in 
Mahayana Buddhism of the analogy between medicine and the Buddhist 
teaching. The analogy between the two is based on the fact that both apply 
certain methods to a person for the sake of that person. The problem of 
paternalist deception arises under this condition. For if the end of a decep-
tive means is not of benefit to the deceived person, the deception clearly 
would be illicit. Never treat a person “merely as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end in itself,” as Kant’s famous formula goes.18 Drawing 
on the analogy between Buddhism and medicine, I would like to add some 
further reflections on the problem of paternalist deception.
The most obvious difference between medicine and Buddhism lies in 
the fact that medicine primarily wants to provide remedies for the body, 
whereas Buddhism primarily wants to provide a remedy for the mind. 
Despite these different starting points, both types of healing extend into the 
domain of the other. In the case of mere physiological suffering, which is 
the original domain of medicine, the problem of paternalist deception does 
not arise. If a certain therapy or medical drug has no physiological effects, 
it will not cure the body. However, if it has effects, it will not only benefit 
the body but also the mind. A physical ailment is a mental burden that is 
relieved by recovery. This interaction between mind and body works in 
17 T no. 475, 14:537a27. 
18 Kant 1785, p. 433. Translation by the author. 
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both directions and is the reason why the problem of paternalist deception 
arises in medicine. As Inoue points out, proficient medical doctors often 
withhold the truth from their patients or make use of placebo drugs because 
doctors know that the mental state of their patients influences their health 
condition. In the twentieth century, the interaction between mind and body 
became firmly established as a medical field in its own right under the name 
of “psychosomatic medicine.” Buddhism, which approaches physiological 
suffering from the mental side, does not promise that all diseases are cured 
by spiritual means. But due to its awareness of mind-body interaction, Bud-
dhism will not preclude the possibility that even severe illnesses like cancer 
can be overcome through mental power.
Regarding the healing of mental suffering, psychotherapy has established 
itself in the repertoire of modern medicine in the same way that psychoso-
matic medicine has. Due to its commitment to science, medical psychother-
apy relies as much as possible on methods that can not only be empirically 
justified to the scientific community, but can also be rationally explained to 
the patient. Methods like guided self-reflection, hypnosis, auto-suggestion, 
or meditation presuppose the conscious cooperation, if not the initiative, of 
the patient. In this regard, they differ from the concealed application of pla-
cebo drugs. Psychotherapy will hesitate to make extensive use of placebos 
for at least three reasons: first, the potential harm the concealed application 
of placebos can do to the trust relationship between therapist and patient; 
and second, the risk of reverse effects when the non-empirical character 
of the placebo medicine is eventually revealed to the patient. Last but not 
least, insofar as the effect of the placebo presupposes the patient’s ignorance 
about the character of the medicine, the application contradicts the principle 
of informed consent.19
It appears that Mahayana Buddhism takes a different stance here. Maha-
yana Buddhism does not only abstain from informing the individual about 
its beneficial self-deceptions, but makes allowance for a paternalist attitude 
that furthers them. Almost all schools of Japanese Buddhism, even the 
Japanese Zen sects, sell charms or encourage prayers to the bodhisattva 
Kannon 観音 (Skt. Avalokiteśvara) for worldly benefit. From this perspec-
tive, Mahayana Buddhism itself appears to be a broad array of deceptive 
19 For a thorough discussion of these complex problems and for further literature see 
“Placebo Effects in Guidelines, Practice, and Patient Choice: Beginning a Conversation 
about an Under-recognized Therapeutic Tool.” 2014. Program in Placebo Studies White 
Paper. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center of Harvard Medical School. http://programin 
placebostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/RWJ_Placebo_White-Paper_v5.pdf.
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means with soteriological purpose. The pragmatic attitude regarding reli-
gious truth sanctifies the deception of the individual for their own good. 
In Kantian terminology this can be analyzed as follows: deception is by 
definition the treatment of a person merely as a means, because the person 
is deprived of their right to consent. The paternalist deception of Mahayana 
Buddhism might only be thought of as legitimate insofar as the purpose of 
the deception is the benefit of the deceived. Although the person is treated 
merely as a means (qua the application of a deceptive device), the person 
is at the same time also treated as an end insofar as freedom from suffering 
can be presupposed as a universal human good. Moreover, if the salvific 
detour is thoroughly transcendent, no reverse effects from disillusion are 
to be expected. Unlike placebo drugs which are always in danger of being 
debunked as empirically anchorless, faith in transcendent deities or fortu-
nate rebirths can never be falsified.
ABBREVIATIONS
IS Inoue Enryō senshū 井上円了選集 (Inoue Enryō Selected Writings). 25 vols. 
Ed. Tōyō Daigaku sōritsu hyakunen shūnen ronbunshū hensan iinkai 東洋
大学創立１００周年記念論文集編纂委員会 (vols. 1–3); Inoue Enryō senshū 
henshū nado iinkai 井上円了選集編集等委員会 (vols. 4–7); Inoue Enryō 
kinen gakujutsu sentā 井上円了記念学術センター (vols. 8–25). Tokyo: Tōyō 
Daigaku, 1987–2004. 
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經. 85 vols. Ed. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠
順次郎 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡辺海旭. Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 
1924–32.
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